Introduction
In June 2015, the latest Journal Impact Factors (JIFs) came out -to much rejoicing among journals where the JIF increased. Research Policy (RP) was one of these, our JIF rising from 2.8 to 3.1, the highest ever. For other journals where there was a fall, there was mostly silence. Among many of those editors, however, there was undoubtedly much discussion about what to do to increase the JIF next time. Ever more energetic efforts and yet more elaborate schemes are doubtless being planned. With RP being the beneficiary of a recent rise, now is perhaps an appropriate time to critically reexamine whether the JIF indicator does tell us something reliable about the relative standing of journals. Do the data produced each year by Thomson Reuters provide "a systematic, objective means to critically evaluate the world's leading journals, with quantifiable, statistical information", as claimed? 1 Over the last 20 years, JIFs have assumed increasing importance among authors and publishers as well as in research assessment schemes. In the academic world, there is 2 growing reliance on indicators and assessments aimed both at individuals (and their career progression in terms of obtaining tenure, promotion etc.) and institutions (subject to research assessment systems, competing in university 'league tables'). All this imposes escalating pressure on academics to 'perform' and maximise their 'score' on the chosen indicators. With this has inevitably come a greater temptation to 'cut corners'. In a small number of cases, this has resulted in clear research misconduct (e.g. fabrication, falsification or plagiarism). In many more cases, it has become manifest in less serious misdemeanours -often labelled 'inappropriate' or 'dubious' conduct (e.g. 'salami publishing', duplicate publication, selfplagiarism ) -where the rules or academic conventions are much less clear. In many research assessments, it is logistically impossible to read all the published contributions so the evaluators resort to 'shortcuts' such as using the JIF to classify all the articles appearing in a given journal. 3 For definitions and a discussion of these various categories, see Martin (2013) . 4 Those who have expressed severe misgivings about JIFs include Moed & Van Leeuwen (1995) , Seglen (1997) , Bloch & Walter (2001) , Smith (2006) , Rossner et al. (2007) , Reedik & Moed (2008) , Lozano et al. (2012) , and Vanclay (2012) , the last of whom provides an extensive literature review. A defence of JIF is to be found in Pendlebury & Adams (2012) . indicators like JIF with regard to the assessment of individual papers and authors. There are perhaps some signs that DORA may be having an effect on this (Hicks et al., 2015, p.431) .
However, there is little evidence that it has weakened the use of JIFs to assess journals. As a result, pressures on editors of journals to enhance their JIF remain intense.
In what follows, we explore different responses by editors, some appropriate, some clearly not, others more borderline. Readers are invited to form their own judgements as to which JIFboosting approaches are appropriate and which are not. Before that, however, we need to look closely at how the JIF indicator is calculated if we are to understand the various stratagems pursued by editors in their efforts to boost it.
The Journal Impact Factor
The Journal Impact Factor (JIF) was devised by Eugene Garfield, the founder of the Institute 6 for Scientific Information (ISI, now owned by Thomson Reuters) . It is defined as follows:
"[It] is based on 2 elements: the numerator, which is the number of citations in the current year to any items published in a journal in the previous 2 years, and the denominator, which is the number of substantive articles (source items) published in the same 2 years." (Garfield, 1999, p.979; emphasis added) As this definition indicates, the denominator is restricted to articles with a more 'substantive' research content. Which published items do or do not fall into this category is determined by 7 Thomson Reuters in a process singularly lacking in transparency (Rossner et al., 2007) . This gives rise to much lobbying behind the scenes as journals and publishers seek to persuade Thomson Reuters to exclude certain types of publication from the denominator in order to boost their JIF (PLoS Medicine, 2006 , p.707; Rossner et al., 2008 , pp.25455; Metze, 2010 . The asymmetry between the numerator and the denominator is simply an historical legacy from a time when it was technically difficult to separate citations to 'substantive' research articles from those to other types of publication. Today, however, this asymmetry could be easily removed if Thomson Reuters so chose, although it would entail additional work, something which they are apparently not inclined to undertake. The continuing 6 The prehistory of the JIF is described Archambault & Larivière (2009) , along with the original reasons for the asymmetry between the numerator and denominator in the equation and the rather arbitrary choice of the 2year citation window. A comprehensive review of impact factors can be found in Glänzel & Moed (2002). 7 These are sometimes termed 'scholarly citable items' (e.g. Hubbard & McVeigh, 2011) , although this is rather misleading since editorials and other nonsubstantive published items are certainly 'citable'. existence of this anomaly opens up various avenues for opportunistic journal editors to exploit, as we shall see below.
The JIF indicator was originally devised to help librarians and others identify the most important journals. From early on, however, it was recognised as having major shortcomings at least for research evaluation purposes (see e.g. Seglen, 1997) , including the following:
• The 2year citation window is too short for most fields -annual citation rates for articles typically peak after three to five years (see e.g. IMU, 2008, p.7).
• There are wide variations with journal and field in the proportion of published items not included in the JIF denominator, while the process by which Thomson Reuters classifies published items as 'substantive' has been characterised as "unscientific and arbitrary" (PLoS Medicine, 2006, p.707) .
• There are variations with type of paper, so review journals often emerge at the top of JIF rankings (Rogers, 2002, p.541 ).
• The articles contributing to JIF exhibit a highly skewed distribution , so it is statistically 8 invalid to use an arithmetic mean in calculating JIF (Metze, 2010 , p.937; Vanclay, 2012 .
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• Thomson Reuters insist on quoting JIF to 3 decimal places (i.e. 4 significant figures for many journals), even though the number of papers and citations involved means that most JIF values are not reliable to more than two significant figures (Hicks et al., 2015) .
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• Independent efforts to replicate individual JIF values have failed, Thomson Reuters apparently using data that noone else is allowed to see (Rossner et al., 2007 (Rossner et al., & 2008 . The median would be a somewhat more appropriate measure (it would, for instance, avoid the problem described in the previous footnote), but perhaps even better would be to give percentiles -e.g. the percentage of a journal's papers among the top 10% (say) of its category. The use of percentiles is discussed in 'The Leiden Manifesto for research metrics' (see Hicks et al., 2015, point 6) and in Pulverer (2015) . 10 For many journals, the JIF may fluctuate by 2040% per annum, showing the large amount of random 'noise' in the data. 11 As Rossner et al. (2007 , p.1092 Certain authors regard publishing the findings of a study in different journals as part of attracting as wide a range of readers as possible, while others condemn this as 'duplicate' or 'redundant' publication. Quite a few authors feel free to recycle text from their earlier papers, while editors may take the line that this constitutes selfplagiarism if the author fails to make it clear to the reader that the same text has been used elsewhere (Martin, 2013) . And while some researchers feel at liberty to subsequently revise or change their hypotheses to arrive at statistically more significant findings, others see this as HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are Known -see Kerr, 1998) or post hoc retrofitting of hypotheses to the data (O'Boyle et al., 2014; Martin, 2015b , as a result of which many claimed findings may be invalid (Ioannidis, 2005) .
In examining the efforts of editors to boost their JIF, we may find a similar distinction helpful. Some efforts are completely legitimate, while others, once exposed, are widely deemed to be unethical. For certain editorial practices, however, the conventions are less clear and opinions may differ as to whether they are appropriate or not. In determining whether particular behaviour is appropriate, the reader might like to bear in mind the figure in one of our papers, we revoke the acceptance of the paper". See also Hernán (2008, p.368) . 12 For a brief discussion of the application of the hindex to journals, see Martin (2015a) . 13 Research misconduct is conventionally defined as "fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting research results" (see http://grants.nih.gov/grants/research_integrity/research_misconduct.htm -accessed on 29 July 2015).
following question: "Would I, as editor, feel embarrassed if my activities came to light and would I therefore object if I was publicly named?" If the answer is 'Yes' or even 'Perhaps', then the editorial behaviour in question is probably inappropriate (Martin, 2015b) .
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Stratagems to boost JIF
Editors' efforts to boost their JIF involve increasing the numerator in the JIF equation (i.e. the total number of citations) and/or reducing the denominator. As early as 1997, the first reports emerged of editors manipulating their JIF in a dubious or unethical manner (Smith, 1997) . A wide range of approaches have been identified (e.g. Reedik and Moed, 2008) , with Falagas and Alexiou (2008) drawing up a list of "the topten in journal impact factor manipulation".
Here, we focus on some of the most common.
Reducing the JIF denominator
For particular fields such as medicine and for certain general scientific journals (e.g. Nature , Science ), a large proportion of published items are not substantive research articles and hence not counted in the JIF denominator. These include editorials, book reviews, comments, correspondence, viewpoints and so on. For example, in a recent issue of The Lancet research articles and review articles constituted less than 20% of the total items published. True, the nonsubstantive items tend to earn fewer citations but they nevertheless contribute appreciably to the overall citation total and hence increase the JIF numerator. Indeed, Moed 
Increasing the JIF numerator
The most obvious way to increase the citation total is to encourage the submission of better quality papers. This is something all journals do and noone would surely question this.
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Another is to seek to publish more review articles, on the assumption that these will generate more citations. (There has been no deliberate policy to do this at RP; instead, we have left it 'to the market', waiting for authors to submit review articles rather than soliciting them.)
Rather more dubious are efforts by editors to encourage or even coerce authors to include more citations to their journal. Some approaches to this are 'softer' -letting it be known that editors expect more than x citations to the journal if it is to be given serious consideration.
This message may be conveyed explicitly (e.g. in correspondence with authors) or diffused through other, less formal means (e.g. 'advice' after a preliminary look at a possible submission). The view taken at Research Policy is that even this is not appropriate behaviour.
Research of the type appearing in RP is also published in a range of other journals, and it would be unrealistic to assume, let alone require, a certain number of citations to previous RP articles. However, what is expected is that authors will have made an effort to orient their paper to the interests of RP readers, including embedding the study in the sort of literature that RP readers are familiar with (much of which may not have been published in RP).
Much more troubling, however, is the approach adopted by some editors of waiting until authors are at their most vulnerable -i.e. just before final acceptance of a paper -and then asking for the addition of a number of citations to the journal from the previous two years (the giveaway to the JIF game being played). If there is a clear intellectual justification as to why specific references are pertinent to that particular paper, then that is one matter. But if there is no such specific justification, merely a general request to add some recent references to the journal, then that comes under the heading of 'coercive citation'.
In a study of several thousand social scientists, Wilhite and Fong (2012a) Another well known device to increase the JIF numerator is to use editorials as an opportunity to cite large numbers of recent articles from the journal. This might take the apparently innocuous form of a guide to young researchers on what sorts of papers the journal publishes, or an effort to summarise the main developments in the field over the last couple of years. In some cases, an editor may take this to the extreme, citing every article 19 16 "Coercive selfcitation refers to requests that (i) give no indication that the manuscript was lacking in attribution; (ii) make no suggestion as to specific articles, authors, or a body of work requiring review; and (iii) only guide authors to add citations from the editor's journal" (Wilhite & Fong, 2012, p.542) . 17 Most commentators would surely agree with this but for a somewhat contrary view, see Krell (2010 2. Citations to a paper tend to build up slowly in Years 1 and 2 and then accumulate at a much faster rate in Years 3 and 4. By holding a paper in the online queue for two years, when it is finally published, it is then earning citations at the Year 3 rate. Papers in Year 3 typically earn about the same number of citations as in Years 1 and 2 combined, and the Year 4 figure is broadly similar. Hence, the net effect of this is to add a further 50% or 25 so to the doubling effect described above ( the JIF accelerator effect ).
3. The astute editor, when deciding which papers in the online queue should be chosen to publish in the next issue, can 'cherry pick' those accruing citations at a faster rate.
Conversely, those online papers still earning few citations can be left in the online queue where, because they do not count in the JIF denominator, they do not 'dilute' the JIF. If 22 See https://editorethics.uncc.edu/editorethics20code/ (accessed on 29 July 2015). 23 The author stumbled across it by accident in trying to track down the full published reference for an article published online 15 months earlier (see Martin, 2015b) . 24 For confirmation that citations to online papers do indeed count towards the JIF numerator, see the Sage website ( http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/SageColl_PAP.xhtml accessed on 5 August 2015) or the website of one of Wiley's journals ( http://www.biometrics.tibs.org/fpdoi.htm accessed on 6 August 2015). 25 The data here come from the management journal with a particularly long online queue. the editor has available a queue, say, of two yearsworth of papers from which those to be published in a given year are to be chosen, and if the top 50% most cited papers are indeed chosen, then for a typical journal these earn approximately twice as many 26 citations per year as the bottom 50% (least cited) papers (i.e. a third more than the overall average). Hence, this stratagem offers the possibility for a further 30% increase of the JIF ( the JIF cherrypicking effect ).
4. Finally, a really smart editor might leave some of the highest cited papers in the online queue until he/she is ready to compile the January issue at the start of the calendar year.
That way, these papers would have the longest possible time to accrue citations before the JIF window closes. Since papers published in the first of the two years included in the JIF 'window' tend to predominate in contributing to the JIF calculation, the effect is to give the most cited papers 23 months to contribute rather than an average of around 17 months. Hence, if an editor was able to implement this strategy successfully, it could add up to another 30% or so to the JIF ( the JIF frontloading effect ).
There is, however, one peculiar 'downside' to having a long online queue. This is to deny the journal those citations from the online papers to other recent papers in the same journal (Thomson Reuters only scans published articles for citations). Indeed, if all papers were held in the queue for at least two years, the withinjournal selfcitation rate would drop to zero! For journals with a relatively high selfcitation rate of, say, around 50%, this would halve the number of citations to the journal and hence its JIF. Consequently, the online queue stratagem would make little sense to such journals. However, the negative effect of losing these selfcitations will be much less serious for a journal, say, with a selfcitation rate of 10%.
Typically, leading management journals have a selfcitation rate of 10% or less, so the online queue will be much more tempting for these. For them, the only worry is that the online queue then reduces their selfcitation rate to such a low figure that it might then attract suspicion.
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Adding all the above effects together (and even accepting that for practical and other reasons 26 See previous footnote. 27 There is an analogy here with drug cheats in athletics. In their efforts to 'beat the system' in a test for a particular banned substance, they may end up with a suspiciously low reading for some other chemical.
not all the benefits can be exploited to the full), one can have a potentially huge effect on the JIF, increasing it severalfold. Most importantly, no 'rules' have apparently been broken! There is nothing to say that a journal has to convert an online paper to a fully published article within a set time. Indeed, some journals argue that such a waiting list is the inevitable consequence of being a top journal where competition for a published 'slot' is high -in other words, they make a virtue of the lengthy delay. In short, just as clever accountants find sophisticated ways to reduce or avoid paying taxes while not breaking any rules so that the endresult is classified as 'tax avoidance' rather than 'tax evasion', so certain journal editors have now hit upon a way of manipulating their JIF without apparently infringing any rules.
Such a stratagem would probably not work in fastmoving scientific fields where the pressure is on to publish quickly; if held in a queue for one or two years, there is a major risk of being 'scooped' by a competitor. But for social sciences like management studies, this is less of 28 an issue. Some editors seem prepared to risk the annoyance of authors held in the queue for the sake of substantially boosting their journal's impact factor during their period of office.
This simple, even elegant stratagem to boost the JIF has rarely been mentioned in the numerous editorials and other publications dissecting JIF abuses. One exception is Vanclay In disputes over precedence, priority is traditionally determined on the basis of the date of publication rather than the more nebulous date of when a paper was first made available online. 29 As Wilhite and Fong (2012, p.543) note, "Coercive selfcitation … is more common in the business disciplines than in economics, sociology, and psychology".
'innovation'. One leading management journal (in the top half dozen in terms of JIF) at the time of writing (September 2015) had an online queue of 160 papers stretching back not two but nearly three years, while two other eminent ones had queues of 15 and 12 months respectively. This is ironic as management journals have devoted much effort in recent 30 years to speeding up the review and editing process, shaving months off this (putting greater pressure on reviewers and authors in the process to achieve this), only to then hold up authors at the final stage of publication for a year or more.
Does the development of a prolonged online queue constitute academic misconduct?
Probably not, since as noted earlier no rules have seemingly been broken. But does it 31 constitute inappropriate or dubious conduct? Well, that depends on how the editors who have been using the online queue to boost their JIF would respond if one were to suggest publicly naming them. If they truly believe that their behaviour has been completely appropriate, then presumably they can have no objection to being named. However, if they feel uncomfortable with that prospect, then one can only conclude that they, too, recognise that what they have done represents at best dubious, and at worst inappropriate, behaviour.
Where does Research Policy stand with regard to the procedure for handling its online queue? In the past, RP editors determined which articles were published and when. The broad strategy was to keep the queue as short as possible, just long enough to ensure there were sufficient articles to fill the next issue. However, in recent years Elsevier has moved to a new system of 'article based publishing'. In this, once authors have corrected their proofs and Elsevier has completed the necessary changes and checks, an article is placed in the next issue and given the next available page number. Hence, with the exception of papers prepared for a Special Issue (which must wait until a new issue becomes available so they can all be grouped together), there is only a very short online queue of papers consisting of those where 30 In addition, a journal concerned with ethics in business had an online queue of no less than 600 papers at the time of writing (September 2015). (The same journal appears in Table S12 in Wilhite & Fong, 2012b) . 31 Some, however, might see the use of a prolonged online queue as in breach of Article I of the Editors Ethics Code referred to earlier (which rules out "inappropriate citation inflation practices"), or perhaps more specifically Article III. The latter stipulates "Fairness to authors" and under this includes an explicit commitment to "the timely dissemination of published work" (see https://editorethics.uncc.edu/editorethics20code/ (accessed on 29 July 2015). Whether asking authors to wait up to three years between acceptance and final publication constitutes "timely dissemination of published work" is a moot point.
some residual issue (e.g. copyright) is being resolved. This removes any possibility of editors manipulating JIF through this means.
Conclusions
As competitive pressures on journals and their editors have grown, so the temptation to engage in ever more elaborate 'games' to raise the JIF have increased. Some of these clearly involve misconduct (coercive citations, journal cartels), while others are borderline -they may not necessarily breach any rules or norms but are certainly open to question.
All this raises three fundamental issues. The first is that the JIF would now seem to have little credibility as an indicator of the academic standing of a journal (even assuming it ever had).
Besides all the technical problems (the 2year citation window being too short for most fields, the asymmetry between the JIF numerator and denominator, the inappropriate use of an arithmetic mean for a highly skewed distribution, the spurious precision implied by quoting JIF values to 3 decimal places), we currently have a whole slew of editorial practices to boost JIF by fair means or foul. Consequently, in many cases all that the JIF indicator now measures is how assiduously a journal's editors are playing the JIF 'game' (Metze, 2010, p.939) and their willingness to steer as close as possible to, and perhaps even to cross, the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate behaviour in pursuit of that goal.
It is well known that, as soon as one attempts to measure a system, that system changes. In social systems, intelligent actors, once they realise they are being measured and become familiar with 'the rules of the game', tend to change their behaviour in order to maximise their score. From the world of economics, we know that when a particular indicator becomes the focus of attention or more specifically a 'performance target', it rapidly loses its credibility and utility for measuring the phenomenon it was originally supposed to capture.
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While the JIF, when introduced several decades ago, may initially have had some credibility as an indicator of the relative standing of journals, it has now surely forfeited that. As the San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment stated in 2013, we need to
[g]reatly reduce [the] emphasis on the journal impact factor as a promotional tool, ideally by ceasing to promote the impact factor or by presenting the metric in the context of a variety of journalbased metrics … that provide a richer view of journal performance.
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Secondly, this analysis of editors' responses to the JIF game provides an interesting casestudy of how in a competitive environment, whatever the codified rules of behaviour, smart players will always try to find ways of 'bending' those rules or otherwise beating the system. The archetypal example of this, as noted earlier, is to be found in the area of tax avoidance. All individuals and institutions are expected to abide by government rules on tax.
Failure to do so constitutes tax evasion, a serious offence. However, when the stakes are high, rich individuals and large companies will go to great lengths to find ways round those rules.
Such 'tax avoidance' schemes are regarded as legal, even though the intent is the same as in tax evasion, namely to reduce or avoid paying taxes. Yet those who have engaged in tax avoidance dislike being publicly identified, which indicates that they feel uncomfortable with their behaviour. Likewise with editors' ingenious efforts to inflate their JIF while seemingly staying within the rules; if such editors feel uncomfortable at the prospect of their activities being publicly exposed, then this is surely evidence that those activities come in the category of inappropriate or at least questionable behaviour.
Thirdly and finally, the JIFenhancing stratagems of editors are but part of a wider problem of misconduct and inappropriate behaviour in the academic world. All the evidence suggests this is on the increase, driven by increasing competitive pressures to 'perform'. If we are to stem the tide, then those who try to uphold the rules must themselves abide by those rules, if not a higher standard. Thus, university faculty who instruct students about the rules, say, on plagiarism, must strictly adhere to those same rules, otherwise they lose any credibility in their efforts to enforce them. Likewise, journal editors are required to enforce the rules regarding misconduct on authors. When authors transgress, editors need the necessary authority to uphold the rules and impose sanctions where necessary. If editors themselves are engaging in inappropriate or dubious behaviour, they will surely be seen as lacking in credibility and authority. One of the main bastions holding back the growing scourge of 33 See http://www.ascb.org/dora/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/SFDeclarationFINAL.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2015). Following the DORA declaration, various proposals have been put forward for developing alternatives to JIF such as publishing the distribution of citations (Pulverer, 2015) . research misconduct will then have been breached. The consequences could be untold.
